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A Construction for Authentication/ secrecy Codes from 
3-homogeneous Permutation Groups 
D. R. STINSON AND L. TEIRLINCK 
In this paper, we construct codes which provide both secrecy and authentication using 
3-homogeneous groups. We construct an infinite family of codes which provide perfect secrecy 
even if the same encoding rule is used three times in succession; and provide optimal protection 
against deception by an opponent who observes up to two authentic messages and then 
substitutes a message of his own choosing. 
1. AUTHENTICATION AND SECRECY 
This paper is a continuation of [19], in which we studied the properties of codes with 
respect to secrecy and authentication. We are interested in the unconditional, or 
theoretical, security provided by such codes: that is, we assume that any opponents 
have unlimited computational resourcef The theory of unconditional secrecy is due to 
Shannon [14]. More recently, Simmons has developed an analogous theory of 
unconditional authentication. 
We shall use the model of authentication theory as described by Simmons in [15], 
[16] and [17]. In this model, there are three participants: a transmitter, a receiver and 
an opponent. The transmitter wants to communicate some information to the receiver, 
whereas the opponent wants to deceive the receiver. The opponent can either 
impersonate the receiver, or, modify a message which has been sent by the transmitter, 
in each case attempting to make him accept a fraudulent message as authentic. 
More formally, we have a set of k source states ::1, a set of v messages .;(,£, and a set 
of b encoding rules 'if. A source state s E Y is the information that the transmitter 
wishes to communicate to the receiver (i.e. the plaintext). The transmitter and receiver 
will have secretly chosen an encoding rule (or key) e E 'if beforehand. An encoding rule 
e will be used to determine the message (or ciphertext) e(s) to be sent to communicate 
any source state s. It is possible that more than one message can be used to determine 
a particular source state (this is called splitting). However, in order for the receiver to 
be able to uniquely determine the source state from the message sent, there can be at 
most one source state which is encoded by any given message mE.;(,£ (i.e. e(s) =#=e(s') if 
s *s '). It is useful to think of a code as being represented by a b x k matrix, where the 
rows are indexed by encoding rules, the columns are indexed by source states, and the 
entry in row e and column s is e(s ). 
We are interested in the security of such a code with respect to both secrecy and 
authentication. Suppose an opponent observes i (;:;o:O) distinct messages being sent over 
the communication channel using the same encoding rule. Although he knows that the 
same encoding rule is being used to transmit the i messages, he does not know what 
that encoding rule is. If we consider the code as a secrecy system, then we make the 
assumption that the opponent can only observe the messages being sent. Our goal is 
that the opponent be unable to determine any information regarding the i source states 
from the i messages he has observed. 
In [10] and [13], the following scenario for authentication is investigated. As before, 
an opponent observes i distinct messages sent using the same encoding rule. The 
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opponent then sends a message m' to the receiver, hoping to have it accepted as 
authentic (this message m' must be distinct from the i messages already sent). In [10], 
Massey calls this a spoofing attack of order i. We remark that the special cases i = 0 and 
i = 1 have been studied extensively by Simmons and other people (see [2], [4], [15], 
[16], [17], [18] and [19]). The case i = 0 is called the impersonation game, and the case 
i = 1 is called the substitution game. 
For any i, there will be some probability distribution on the set of i source states 
which occur. We ignore the order in which the i source states occur, and assume that 
no source state occurs more than once. Also, we assume that any set of i source states 
has a non-zero probability of occurring. Given a set of i source states S, we define p(S) 
to be the probability that the source states in S occur. 
Given the probability distributions on the source states described above, the receiver 
and transmitter will choose a probability distribution for jg, called an encoding strategy. 
If splitting occurs, then they will also determine a splitting strategy to determine m E .;(,{,, 
givens E Y and e E jg_ In this paper, however, we consider only codes without splitting. 
Once the transmitter/receiver have chosen encoding strategies, we can define for each 
i;;;.: 0 a probability denoted Pd;, which is the probability that the opponent can deceive 
the transmitter/receiver with a spoofing attack of order i. 
THEOREM 1.1 [10, p. 12]. In an authentication code without splitting, Pd;;;;.: 
(k- i)/(v- i). 
Following Massey [10], we say that the authentication code is L-fold secure against 
spoofing if Pd; = (k- i)/(v- i) for 0 ~ i ~ L. 
When we consider the secrecy properties of a code, we desire that no information be 
conveyed by the observation of the messages which are transmitted. We say that a code 
has perfect L-fold secrecy if, for every L' ~ L, for every set M1 of L' messages observed 
in the channel, and for every set S1 of L' source states, we have p(S1 IM1) = p(S1). 
That is, observing a set of L' messages in the channel gives no information to the 
opponent regarding the L' source states. 
Define an L-code to be a code which achieves perfect L-fold secrecy and is 
(L -1)-fold secure against spoofing. A lower bound on the number of encoding rules 
required in any L-code is given by the following theorem, proved in [19]. 
THEOREM 1.2. If a code achieves perfect L-fold secrecy and is (L- 1)-fold secure 
against spoofing, then b;;;.: (L). 
An L-code is optimal if the number of encoding rules is (L). A construction for 
optimal 2-codes was given in [19]. In this note, we give a construction for an infinite 
class of 3-codes in which the number of encoding rules is v(v -1)(v- 2)/2, or three 
times the optimal value. We also give some examples of optimal 3-codes. 
2. A CONSTRUCTION FOR OPTIMAL L-CODES USING PERPENDICULAR ARRAYS 
Our interest in this paper is in constructing L-codes. We can do this using a type of 
combinatorial design known as a perpendicular array. A perpendicular array 
PA;.(t, k, v) is a A·(~) by k array, A, of the symbols {1, ... , v}, which satisfies the 
following properties: 
(i) every row of A contains k distinct symbols; 
(ii) for any t columns of A, and for any t distinct symbols, there are precisely A rows r 
of A such that the t given symbols all occur in row r in the given t columns. 
For t;;;.: 2, it is easy to see that property (i) is implied by the other assumptions. 
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Some necessary conditions for the existence of a PA;,(t, k, v) are given in [8], as 
follows. 
THEOREM 2.1. Suppose that 0 ~ t' ~ t and (~);:;;;: (~). Then a PA;..(t, k, v) is also a 
PAw>(t', k, v), where 
Hence, 
A· (v- t') =0 modulo ( t).
t- t' t' 
We have the following construction for secrecy codes using perpendicular arrays. 
THEOREM 2.2. If there exists a PA;..(t, k, v) which at the same time is a 
PA;..(t')(t', k, v) for all t' ~ t, then there is a code fork source states with v messages and 
A· (D encoding rules, which achieves perfect t-fold secrecy. 
PROOF. Let A be a PA;..(t, k, v), which at the same time is a PAw>(t', k, v) for all 
t' ~ t. We construct an encoding rule from each row r of A: for each row 
r=(xv ... ,xk), and for each source states (1~s~k), define e,(s)=xs. Use each 
encoding rule with probability 1/A · (~). It is easy to see that we have perfect t' -fold 
secrecy for all t' ~ t, since any set of t' messages corresponds equally often (namely 
A(t') times) to every possible set oft' source states. D 
Note that if k;;::2t-1, then(~);:;;;:(~) for all t'~t. Thus, by Theorem 2.1, any 
PA;..(t, k, v) with k;:;;;: 2t -1 satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2.2. 
In order for a code constructed by means of Theorem 2.2 to be (t- 1)-fold secure 
against spoofing, our PA must enjoy an extra property. A PA;..(t, k, v), A, is said to be 
an authentication PA (and is denoted APA;..(t, k, v)) if the following property holds: 
For any t' ~ t- 1, and for any t' + 1 distinct symbols X; (1 ~ i ~ t' + 1), we have 
that among all the rows of A which contain all the symbols X; (1 ~ i ~ t' + 1), the 
t' symbols X; (1 ~ i ~ t') occur in all possible subsets oft' columns equally often. 
The following theorem shows that an APA;..(t, k, v) always satisfies the condition 
required in Theorem 2.2. 
THEOREM 2.3. An APA;..(t, k, v) is also an APAw>(t', k, v) for all t' ~ t. 
PROOF. Let A be an APA;..(t, k, v). If t = t', there is nothing to prove. Hence, 
assume that t' < t and that we have already proved that A is an APA;..(t'+!)(t' + 1, k, v). 
Let C be a set oft' columns of A and let X; (1 ~ i ~ t') be t' distinct symbols. For each 
symbol a f/. {x;: 1 ~ i ~ t'}, there are A(t' + 1) · C· ~ 1 ) rows containing {a} U {x;: 1 ~ i ~ 
t'}. Of these, A(t' + 1) · (t' ~ 1 )/(~) will contain {x;: 1 ~ i ~ t'} in the columns in C. Let 
Ao denote the total number of rows containing {x;: 1 ~ i ~ t'} in the columns in C. We 
count ordered triples (c, xt'+l> r), where c f/. C, xt'+l f/. {x;: 1 ~ i ~ t'}, and row r 
contains {x;: 1 ~ i ~ t'} in the columns in C and xt'+l in column c. This yields 
(k- t') · A0 = (v- t') · A(t' + 1) · C,: ) / (;).1
Simplifying this equation yields A0 = A(t'). Thus, A is a PAw>(t', k, v ). The fact that A 
is an APA is obvious. D 
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Obviously, a necessary condition for the existence of an APAA(t, k, v) is that 
A(t' + 1) · c, ~ ) =0 modulo(:,)1
for all t', 0,;;;; t',;;;; t -1. In the case t = 3 and ). = 1, we see that k = 2 modulo 3 is 
necessary. 
THEOREM 2.4. If there exists an APAA(t, k, v), then there is a t-code for k source 
states with v messages and).·(~) encoding rules. 
PROOF. This is a modification of [19, Theorem 4]. Let A be an APAA(t, k, v). 
Construct the code as in Theorem 2.2. We need only verify that Pd; = (k- i)/(v- i), 
0,;;;; i,;;;; t- 1. Let X; (1,;;;; i,;;;; t' + 1) be distinct messages (0,;;;; t',;;;; t- 1). Define 
E(x1 , ... ,xJ={e:x;E{e(s):sE9'},1:s;;i:s;;j}, and define fe(m)=s if e(s)=m. 
Suppose an opponent observes the t' messages X; (1,;;;; i,;;;; t') in the channel, and then 
sends xt'+l· His chance of successful deception is calculated to be: 
~eeE(x~<····x,·+l)p(e) · p({sv · · ·, s,.} = {fe(xt), · .. ,fe(x,.)}) 
~eeE(xJ, ... ,x,·)p(e) · p({sl, · .. , s,.} = {fe(xt), ... ,fe(x,.)}) 
~eeE(x1 ,. .. ,x,.+1)P({sv · · ·, S,•} = {fe(xt), · .. ,fe(x,.)}) (since p(e) is constant)~eeE(x1 , ... ,x,·)P({sv · · ·, s,.} = {fe(xt), · · · ,fe(x,.)}) 
).(t' +1). (,k ) (t' + 1) ( k ) 
t + 1 t' t' + 1 
=-----­ (Theorem 2.1) 
(v -t') · (:,) 
= (k- t')/(v- t'). 
Hence, Pd,. = (k- t')/(v- t'), as desired. 0 
In [19], the existence of APA1(2, k, v) was studied (in that paper, they were referred 
to as pair-column balanced PAs). The following theorem summarizes known results. 
THEOREM 2.5. There exists an APA1(2, 3, v) iff v?;:; 7 is odd ([19] and Example 1). 
There exists an APA1(2, 5, v) if v =1 or 5 modulo 10, v?;:; 11, v =I= 15 ([9]). There exists 
an APA 1(2, k, v) if k is odd and v = 1 modulo 2k is a prime power ([6]). 
We present an APA1(2, 3, 17). 
ExAMPLE 1. An APA1(2, 3, 17) (private communication from Bert den Boer). Let 
the ;r be the permutation (0 12 3 4 56 7 8 9)(10 1112 13 14)(15 16). Let ;r act on the 
following starting rows, obtaining 10 rows from each of them: 
15 0 1 0 1 15 
3 15 0 11 9 2 
11 1 3 9 2 11 
1 3 11 2 11 1 
3 11 9 0 4 8 
Next, take the images of each of the following three rows under ;r;, i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4: 
0 5 11 5 11 0 
11 0 5 
Finally, take the 21 rows of an APA1(2, 3, 7) on the symbols 10-16. 
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In the next section, we prove some results concerning APA1(3, v, v) and 
APA3(3, v, v) using 3-homogeneous groups. Then, recursive constructions lead to 
APA1(3, k, v) and APA3(3, k, v), where v > k. 
3. 3-HOMOGENEous GROUPS AND AuTHENTICATION PERPENDICULAR ARRAYS 
In a PA-.(t, k, k), every subset of {1, 2, ... , k} appears in all rows. Hence, if A is a 
PA-.(t, k, k), then A is an APA-.(t, k, k) iff A is a PAw>(t', k, k) for all t' ,;;;,f. 
Combining this with Theorem 2.1, we obtain: 
THEOREM 3.1. Every PA-.(t, k, k) with k ~ 2t- 1 is an APA-.(t, k, k). 
A permutation group G is said to have degree n if it acts on a set, say S, of n 
symbols. G is defined to be t-homogeneous if for all t-subsets S1 , Sz ~ S, there are the 
same number of permutations 1r E G such that (S1)'" = S2 • The number of such 1r must 
be IGI/(~). It is clear that if we write down the permutations in at-homogeneous group 
of degree n as the rows of an array, then we obtain a PA-.(t, n, n), where;.,= IGI/(~). 
If 2,;;;, t,;;;, (n + 1)/2, then by Theorem 3.1, the PA will be an APA. 
Of course, codes in which the number of messages equals the number of source 
states are of no use for authentication, since the probability of deception is 1. We build 
codes with more messages than source states by means of a recursive construction using 
t-designs. At-design S(t, k, v) is a set of k-subsets (called blocks) of a v-set, such that 
every t-subset occurs in a unique block. 
THEOREM 3.2. Suppose that there is a t-design S(t, k, v), and an APA-.(t, k, k). 
Then, there is an APA-.(t, k, v). 
PROOF. For each block in the S(t, k, v), construct an APA-.(t, k, k). The union of 
all these APA-.(t, k, k) is an APA-.(t, k, v). D 
In the case t = 3, we have the necessary ingredients for Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. First, 
let us consider examples of 3-homogeneous groups. If q = 3 modulo 4 is a prime 
power, then the group PSL(2, q) is a 3-homogeneous group of degree q + 1 (see, for 
example, [1, Prop. III.6.12]). Since IPSL(2, q)i = (q3 - q)/2, then ;., = 3. Hence, we 
have 
LEMMA 3.3. For any prime power q = 3 modulo 4, there is an APA3(3, q + 1, q + 1). 
Kantor [7] has shown that there are only two examples of sharply 3-homogeneous 
groups (i.e. where ;., = 1) of degree n ~ 6. These are AGL(1, 8) and ArL(1, 32) (see, 
for example, [1, III.5.7]). The resulting APAs are as follows: 
LEMMA 3.4. There is an APA1(3, 8, 8) and an APA1(3, 32, 32). 








6 2 5 0 4 3 1 X 
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There is no sharply 3-homogeneous permutation group of degree 5. However, as noted 
in (8], a PA 1(3, 5, 5) can be obtained by developing the rows 012 3 4 and 0 2 413 
modulo 5. By Theorem 3.1, this is an APA1(3, 5, 5). 
We use a class of 3-designs known as inversive geometries in our recursive 
construction for all prime powers q and for all d ~ 1, there is an S(3, q + 1, qd + 1) (see 
(23]). Hence, we obtain: 
THEOREM 3.5. For any prime power q =3 modulo 4, and for any d ~ 1, there exists 
an APA3(3, q + 1, qd + 1). 
THEOREM 3.6. For any d ~ 1, there exists an APA1(3, 5, 4d + 1), an APA1(3, 8, 7d + 
1) and an APA 1(3, 32, 31d + 1). 
Theorem 3.5 allows us to construct a 3-code for as many source states as desired (by 
taking q large enough), and incorporating any desired level of authentication security. 
For, the resulting code has Pd; approximately equal to 1/qd-t (i = 0, 1, 2), which can 
be made arbitrarily small by taking d large enough. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Two very interesting open problems are whether there are APA 1(3, k, v) for 
arbitrarily large k, and whether there are any APA1(t, k, v) with t ~ 4. 
Some other examples of APA}.(t, k, v) with .?..> 1 exist, as follows. The designs 
ODJ.(t, k, v) defined in (20] are APAJ.. 1,(t, k, v). For any t, there exist OD1(t, t + 1, v) 
for infinitely many values of v by (20]; hence APA1,(t, t + 1, v) exist as well. However, 
the only known OD1(t, k, v) with k > t + 1 and t ~ 6 are the OD1(t, t + 2, t + 2) 
constructed from the alternating group At+2 • These yield APA1,(t, t + 2, t + 2) and 
APA(t+t)!n(t + 1, t + 2, t + 2). Other constructions for ODJ.(t, k, v) are given in (21]. 
The following APAJ.(t, k, k) with 1 <A.< t! and t ~ 4 can be obtained. APA4(4, 9, 9), 
APA4(5, 9, 9), APA6(6, 9, 9), APA14(7, 9, 9) and APA56(8, 9, 9) can be constructed 
from PGL(2, 8); and APA4(4, 33, 33) can be constructed from PrL(2, 32) (see [1] for 
a description of these groups). We are using here the fact that a PAJ.(t, k, k) is also a 
PA}.(k- t, k, k). 
From the PA3(3, 6, 6) constructed in (8], we obtain an APA3(3, 6, 6), APA4(4, 6, 6) 
and APA10(5, 6, 6). Moreover, the APA1(3, 5, 5) mentioned in Section 3 is also an 
APA2(4, 5, 5). 
Using t-designs constructed by Witt (22], Denniston (3] and Mills (11], together with 
Theorem 3.2 we obtain APA2(4, 5, v) for v = 11, 23, 47 and 83; APA4(4, 6, 27); and 
APA10(5, 6, v) for v = 12, 24, 48 and 84. 
Finally, let us mention that designs ODJ.(t, k, v) and APAJ.(t, k, v) can be con­
structed recursively using t-wise balanced designs, in a manner similar to Construction 
2.1 of (8]. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This research was supported in part by the Institute for Mathematics and its 
Applications, with funds provided by the National Science Foundation. The research of 
the first author was supported by NSERC grant A9287, and the research of the second 
author was supported by NSA grant MDA 904-88-H-2005. 
79 A construction for authentication Isecrecy codes 
REFERENCES 
1. Th. Beth, D. Jungnickel and H. Lenz, Design Theory, Bibliographisches Institut, Zurich, 1985. 
2. E. F. Brickell, A few results in message authentication, Congressus Numer. 43 (1984), 141-154. 
3. R. H. F. Denniston, Some new 5-designs, Bull. London Math. Soc., 8 (1976), 263-267. 
4. M. De Soete, Some constructions for authentication-secrecy codes, in: Advances in Cryptology: 
Proceedings of Eurocrypt '88, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 330 Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 
1988, pp. 57-76. 
5. E. Gilbert, F. J. MacWilliams and N.J. A. Sloane, Codes which detect deception, Bell System Tech. J., 
53 (1974), 405-424. 
6. A. Granville, A. Moisiadis and R. Rees, Nested Steiner n-gon systems and perpendicular arrays, J. 
Comb. Math. Comb. Comput., 3 (1988), 163-167. 
7. W. M. Kantor, k-homogeneous groups, Math. Z., 124 (1972), 261-265. 
8. E. S. Kramer, D. L. Kreher, R. Rees and D. R. Stinson, On perpendicular arrays with t;;;.3, Ars 
Combin., to appear. 
9. C. C. Lindner and D. R. Stinson, Steiner pentagon systems, Discr. Math., 52 (1984), 67-74. 
10. J. L. Massey, Cryptography-a selective survey, in: Digital Communications, 1986, pp. 3-21. 
11. W. H. Mills, A new 5-design, Ars Combin., 6 (1978), 193-195. 
12. R. C. Mullin, P. J. Schellenberg, G. H. J. van Rees and S. A. Vanstone, On the construction of 
perpendicular arrays, Utilitas Math., 18 (1980), 141-160. 
13. P. Schobi, Perfect authentication systems for data sources with arbitrary statistics, presented at 
Eurocrypt '86. 
14. C. E. Shannon, Communication theory of secrecy systems, Bell System Tech. J., 28 (1949), 656-715. 
15. G. J. Simmons, A game theory model of digital message authentication, Congressus Numer., 34 (1982), 
413-424. 
16. G. J. Simmons, Message authentication: a game on hypergraphs, Congressus Numer., 45 (1984), 
161-192. 
17. G. J. Simmons, Authentication theory/coding theory, in: Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of 
CRYPTO 84, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 196, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1985, pp. 411-432. 
18. D. R. Stinson, Some constructions and bounds for authentication codes, J. Cryptol., 1 (1988), 37-51. 
19. D. R. Stinson, A construction for authentication/secrecy codes from certain combinatorial designs, J. 
Cryptol., 1 (1988), 119-127. 
20. L.Teirlinck, On large sets of disjoint ordered designs, Ars Combin., 25 (1988), 31-37. 
21. L. Teirlinck, Generalized idempotent orthogonal arrays, to appear. 
22. E. Witt, Die funffach transitiven Gruppen von Mathieu, Abh. Math. Sem. Hamburg, 12 (1938), 
256-264. 
23. E. Witt, Uber Steinersche Systeme, Abh. Math. Sem. Hamburg, 12 (1938), 265-275. 
Received 24 October 1988 and accepted in revised form 20 June 1989 
D. R. STINSON 
Department of Computer Science, 
University of Manitoba, 
Winnipeg, Manitoba R3T 2N2, Canada 
L. TEIRLINCK 
Department of Algebra, Combinatorics and Analysis, 
Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama 36849, U.S.A. 
